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Looking Beyond the Negative-Positive Rights
Distinction: Analyzing Constitutional Rights
According to their Nature, Effect, and Reach*
BY JORGE M. FARINACCI-FERNÓS**
Introduction
The relatively short catalogue of rights recognized by the
Constitution of the United States, coupled with their near exclusive
articulation as political and civil rights of a negative character
opposable only to state action, has substantially narrowed the scope
of analysis as to the different features and manifestations of
constitutional rights in general. This has led the debate amongst U.S.
scholars to focus their attention to rights as a sometimes simplistic
dichotomy between negative political rights on the one hand, and
positive socioeconomic rights on the other, which are more typically
found in modern, teleological constitutions.
In this brief Article, I wish to challenge and transcend that
narrow dichotomy and analyze the different variables applicable to
constitutional rights, considering several interacting features. First,
the nature of a right, that is, whether it is civil and political or
socioeconomic. Second, the effect of a right, that is, whether it is
negative rights that protect the titleholder against the actions of
others or positive rights that entitle its titleholder to require others to
act. Third, the reach of a right, that is, whether it is vertical rights
opposable to the state or horizontal rights opposable to private
parties. Finally, the titleholder of the right, which could be an

* This Article is based on a chapter of the author’s S.J.D. dissertation: ORIGINAL
EXPLICATION AND POST-LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE ROLE OF INTENT AND HISTORY IN
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF TELEOLOGICAL CONSTITUTIONS, S.J.D. Dissertation, Georgetown
University Law Center (2017).
** B.A., M.A. and J.D. (University of Puerto Rico-Río Piedras); LL.M. (Harvard Law
School); S.J.D. (Georgetown University Law Center). Associate Professor, Interamerican
University of Puerto Rico Law School.
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individual or a collective entity.
These sets of variables demonstrate the potential multiplicity in
terms of the actual articulation of constitutional rights. Rights come
in all shapes and sizes. This requires a more precise analysis of the
different features mentioned above with greater care and individual
attention, so as to better understand the different manifestations
constitutional rights can take. This can help us better understand the
different uses of rights and, in turn, aid courts in their efforts to
adequately apply these rights in a wide range of circumstances. This
discussion could also be helpful in the discussion about
constitutional rights in general and the usefulness of post-liberal
constitutionalism.
One of the most enduring legacies of liberal constitutional
theory has been the focus on rights as central to modern
constitutionalism.1 While older framework constitutions normally
give more attention to governmental structure and institutions, even
they tend to start with the Bill of Rights and only later turn to the
structural provisions.2 Teleological constitutions, that is,
constitutions that focus more on substantive policy issues and goals,
continue this practice of giving priority to rights. The focus on rights
is a shared feature of both liberal and post-liberal constitutional
systems.
The effect of this focus on rights has been so compelling that
many actually believe that most of the substantive policy content of a
constitution lies in its rights provisions. If it is substantive in nature,
it probably is a right. This constitutes a true rights revolution,3 and it
is a very individual-based approach to constitutional theory. This
logic has created an interesting, but not total, self-perpetuating cycle:
Because most people believe that substantive provisions equal rights,
constitution-makers do, in fact, articulate constitutional substance in
the form of explicit rights, thus reinforcing the original view.
Rights-centered constitutional theory is a mainstream view: “[the]
1. See VICTOR F. COMMELLA, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS & DEMOCRATIC VALUES: A
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 36 (Yale Univ. Press 2009); Daniel P. Kommers & Russell A.
Miller, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht: Procedure, Practice and Policy of the German
Federal Constitutional Court in CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 104
(Andrew Harding & Peter Leyland, eds., Wildy, Simmonds & Hill Publishing 2009).
2. FERRERES COMELLA, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS & DEMOCRATIC VALUES 78, Op. Cit.
note 1.
3. Víctor Ferreres Comella, Commentary: Courts in Latin America and the
Constraints of the Civil Law Tradition, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1967 (2011).
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protection of fundamental or human rights has been the central
driving force behind the convergence on constitutional fundamentals
since 1945.”4 A central doctrinal issue has been the scope and
breadth of rights.5
But rights are sometimes either bundled up together in a onesize-fits-all descriptive model or characterized in necessary
opposition to each other. For example, as we will see shortly, many
scholars tend to characterize, almost axiomatically, that, because
civil and political rights are negative and opposable to the state, then
socioeconomic rights must be positive rights that create an
entitlement against the state. Such is not the case. The articulation
of rights, even at the constitutional level, is far richer and complex.
Classic liberal constitutions include the familiar list of (1)
individual, (2) political, (3) negative rights (4) opposable to the state
(vertical). The U.S. experience has been one of negative political
rights at the federal level. State constitutional regimes are different,
but have been the victims of a judicial approach premised on the
federal model that have put those rights in a state of semihibernation.6 As such, government action that infringes the freedom
of speech, unduly burdens religion, unjustifiably discriminates
against an individual or violates the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures is found to be in violation of the Constitution.
Courts as negative legislators that strike down government actions
that infringe the Constitution take center stage in this approach to
rights. But the articulation of rights is much broader than negative
protection against government action. As we saw, there are multiple
variables that, in turn, create a vast array of combinations that
transcend the classic paradigm.
The U.S. scholarship, as well as other scholars from the liberal
democratic tradition, constantly fails to make these distinctions or
take into account all of these variables. For example, they always
seem to equate, almost inherently, socioeconomic rights as positive
4. Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the Reality of American Constitutional
Exceptionalism, 107 MICH. L. REV. 391, 395 (2008).
5. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Australia: Devotion to Legalism in INTERPRETING
CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 141 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., Oxford Univ. Press,
2006).
6. “Although nearly two dozen state constitutions contain some type of affirmative
guarantee of welfare rights, state courts are extremely reluctant to enforce those rights.”
(Emphasis added.) Elizabeth Pascal, Welfare Rights in State Constitutions, 39 RUTGERS L.J.
863 (2008).
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claims upon the state with the corresponding budgetary and resource
allocation problems which, in turn, fuels their apprehension for
judicially enforced socioeconomic rights.7 This appears to be the
result of an artificial dichotomy: since they are accustomed to
political rights that are negative in nature, they assume that
socioeconomics rights are positive. They seem to be mirror images
of each other. But socioeconomic rights need not be positive and
need not be only opposable to the state. The idea that negative
political rights are wholly enforceable while positive socioeconomic
rights are not fails to distinguish between the multiple articulations of
rights. Let us take a closer look.
A Closer Look at Rights
Rights According to Their Nature
Here we focus on the content and substance of the right itself.
As to this feature, we focus on the distinction between political and
civil rights on the one hand, and socioeconomic rights on the other.
Although historically different, for the purposes of this analysis,
cultural and environmental rights are bundled up with their
socioeconomic counterparts, as they share many of the same features
as to their nature.
Political and Civil Rights
Examples of political and civil rights are freedom of speech and
of the press, freedom of religion and association, criminal procedure
guarantees, due process and the equal protection of the laws.
These are the bread and butter of liberal constitutions. They are
considered first generations rights, precisely because, as a historic
matter, they were the first to be adopted.8 One of the main purposes
and functions of this type of right is to facilitate self-government by
improving the proper operation of the structural machine created by
7. Herman Schwartz, Do Economic and Social Rights Belong in a Constitution?, 10
AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1233, 1235 (1995) (describing the argument made against the
enforceability of these rights).
8. FRANCOIS VENTER, CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON: JAPAN, GERMANY, CANADA AND
SOUTH AFRICA AS CONSTITUTIONAL STATES 130 (Juta & Co., Cape Town, 2000).
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the constitution. It is because of that connection with the structures
of government and the institutions of public power that we label
them as political rights. As a result, they are inherently connected to
the concept of real citizenship and participation in the political
process, hence their label as civil rights. Because of this nature, they
can be characterized as procedural. Historically, these rights are
associated with liberal political theory that focuses on the political
liberty and empowerment of the individual citizen.
Political and civil rights normally take center stage when a
modern constitution is being drafted. There are multiple probable
explanations for this phenomenon. First, their longevity. As part of
the first generation of rights, political and civil rights have been
around longer than any other type of right, and so are almost
automatic in any modern constitutional endeavor. They have
acquired sticking power and thus form part of most modern
constitutions, whether liberal or post-liberal. Second, they are
essential to democratic self-government. Political and civil rights are
part of citizenship and, in turn, avoid a breakdown in the structure
created by the constitution. They are essential to the effective
operation of democracy. As a result, most constitutional designers
recognize their vital role in making the constitutional structure work
effectively. Without these rights, the thinking goes, democratic
politics are weakened and self-government is threatened. Third, the
dominant status of liberal democracy as the main political theory in
the world today has an inevitable spillage effect over to
constitutional design.9 Political rights are seen as a guarantor of a
base core of individual liberty and autonomy central to the liberal
tradition. Yet, these rights have also been adopted by post-liberal
constitutional systems that, while less individualistic in their
approach, do share the view that political right are central to
democratic governance and coexistence.
The historically central role given to political and civil rights is
partially responsible for the skeptical approach many scholars have
to giving constitutional rank to nonpolitical rights: “And once a bill
of rights is being framed or subsequently interpreted, there are

9. See Sujit Choudry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of
Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 821 (1999); Sarah K. Harding,
Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 409, 433 (2003); HANNAH
LERNER, MAKING CONSTITUTIONS IN DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES 209 (Cambridge Univ.
Press, 2011).
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pragmatic reasons for focusing on more traditional civil and political
right and leaving the existence or extent of positive social and
economic rights to legislative discretion.”10 As a result, the inclusion
of these rights in the constitutional text is a political necessity.
Omitting these rights makes the constitution vulnerable to attack as
to their commitment to individual liberty.
Also, because of historical and ideological factors, civil and
political rights tend to be of a negative character.11 In other words,
that they protect against a determined action. They are also typically
opposable to the state. But, as we will see when diving into both the
negative-positive and horizontal-vertical dichotomies, political and
civil rights come in all shapes and sizes. Some constitutions have
broken this classic and limited mold. Yet, the (1) negative and (2)
vertical articulations of political and civil rights are the main
articulations in existence today. As we just saw, ideologically
speaking, these rights also tend to reflect an individualistic outlook,
equating liberty with lack of public intervention.
Socioeconomic Rights
Examples of socioeconomic rights are right to a free public
education, access to quality healthcare, and minimum wage or
maximum hour provisions.
These are the bread and butter of post-liberal teleological
constitutions. They are labeled as second generation rights.12 At a
bare minimum, they continue where political and civil rights left off.
In other words, they add to the list of rights that are necessary for the
democratic process to work. In that sense, they serve a procedural
role along the same lines as political and civil rights: “Economic and
social rights are inextricably intertwined with civil and political
rights.”13 That is, they are partially premised on the notion that civil
10. Gardbaum, supra note 4, at 465.
11. Venter, CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON 12, Op. Cit. note 8.
12. Id. at 130; “[S]uch provisions are not found in traditional bill of rights, such as that
of the United States.” S.P. Sathe, India: From Positivism to Structuralism in INTERPRETING
CONSTITUTIONS 219, Op. Cit. note 5. While socioeconomic rights are associated with more
modern constitutions, Glandon explains that pre-twentieth century “continental European
constitutions and codes acknowledged state obligations to provide food, work, and financial
aid to persons in need.” Mary Ann Glandon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59
U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 524 (1992).
13. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1242˗43.
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and political rights are not, by themselves, enough to guarantee full
citizenship and ensure effective democratic self-government. It is
enough to have the right to speak and worship; denial of an
education, for example, as well as other basic human needs also
weakens citizenship and effective political participation. Yet,
because they are socioeconomic in nature, they are better labeled as
substantive instead of procedural. Their substantive characterization
is strengthened by the fact that their articulation is normally the
product of policy judgments, as in the case, for example, of labor and
employment rights. In other words, they carry actual substantive
content that reflects a policy choice. In that sense, they are not mere
means to an end, but ends in themselves.
Many socioeconomic rights come in the form of positive rights;
many, but not all. Furthermore, that typical characterization as
positive is also accompanied by the label vertical. In other words,
that socioeconomic rights are positive rights that create an
affirmative duty on the state. For now it is important to separate
these aspects: socioeconomic versus positive-vertical. While in
practice many constitutions do put them together, from a conceptual
standpoint they share no inherent link and are not synonymous. Like
political and civil rights, socioeconomic rights also come in different
shapes and sizes. Unfortunately, many scholars still make reference
to socioeconomic rights only as positive or vertical rights.14
This seems to be the result of a U.S.-centered view where, as we
saw, negative political rights opposable to the state are the norm. As
such, any alternative articulation must be its opposite, which is both
conceptually and empirically inaccurate. In fact, one would think
that even an intuitive reading of the term “socioeconomic” would
point to the private sphere, where most of economic activity takes
place and where our social relation to the means of productions is
established. This is related to the vertical-horizontal dichotomy. In
addition, because constitutional rights are normally adopted to
protect weaker groups, it would also seem intuitive that
socioeconomic rights have a negative articulation, in order to protect
the weakest members of society, like the poor or workers, against

14. See CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS: JUDICIAL ROLES IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 17 (Diana
Kapiszweski, Gordon Silverstein & Robert A. Kagan, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, New
York, 2013); Venter, CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON 130, Op. Cit. note 8; FRANCOIS
VENTER, GLOBAL FEATURES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 84 (West Legal Publisher, Nijmegen,
Netherlands, 2010).
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powerful private economic forces.
Aside from their procedural function, socioeconomic rights are
the product of material inequality and the failure of democratic
ordinary politics to solve that problem. There is also a structural
argument for socioeconomic rights: to protect vulnerable people
from the failures of ordinary politics. As to their substantive content,
socioeconomic rights cover, at a minimum, basic human material
needs, such as education, healthcare, food, housing and employment.
If all else fails, a core minimum of sustenance is addressed, although
that does not necessarily imply government guaranteed sustenance.
Aside from the familiar list of healthcare, housing and
education, there are other types of socioeconomic rights that must
be mentioned briefly. First, labor rights. Almost by definition,
these rights are mostly horizontal than vertical; that is, that they
operate against private employers.15 This is crucial in the effort to
widen our view of socioeconomic rights are merely a laundry list
of entitlements against the state and the public coffers. Second,
even though some have characterized environmental protection
provisions as belonging to third-generation rights,16 because of
their similarity with second-generation rights, I think it is correct
to include this type of provision within the socioeconomic rights
family.17
More than mere aspirational declarations, many of these
rights are directly enforceable. In these cases, the constitution is
not just a mission statement but offers “substantive standards of
social rights.”18 But even in situations where a right is not directly
enforceable, it does not mean it has no role no play or that it has
no legal significance or consequence: “Putting rights into a
constitution, even if not judicially enforceable, is not an idle
15. See Pedro C. Magalhales, Explaining the Constitutionalization of Rights:
Portuguese Hypothesis and a Cross-National Test in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF CONSTITUTIONS 441, Op. Cit. note 17; Helen Hershkoff & Stephen Loffredo, State
Courts and Constitutional Socio-Economic Rights: Exploring the Underutilization Thesis,
115 PENN ST. L. REV. 923, 929 (2011); Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Adjudication in
Europe and the United States: Paradoxes and Contrast, 2 INT’L J. CONST. LAW 1, 25 (2004).
16. Venter, CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON 131, Op. Cit. note 8.
17. Jeff King, Constitutions as Mission Statements in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 83 (Dennis Galligan & Mila Versteeg, eds., Cambridge
Univ. Press, 2013); Pascal, supra note 6, at 863˗64.
18. Dennis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg, Theoretical Perspectives on the Social and
Political Foundations of Constitutions in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONS 12, Op. Cit. note 17.
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gesture.”19
Almost by definition, socioeconomic rights aim to protect weak
members of society. That weakness is not necessarily numerical, as
in the protection of minorities. The protected parties may by
economically powerless and vulnerable to abuse by more powerful
forces.
Yet, which socioeconomic rights are constitutionally
protected is not universally established. While there is a historical
tendency in favor of progressive rights that typically protect the
poorest and most vulnerable members of society, some
socioeconomic rights can also include the property rights of less
vulnerable groups. But, more conservative property rights have been
severely weakened during the last decades.20 Finally, some would
say that property rights, as first adopted in liberal constitutions, are
mostly seen – whether correctly or incorrectly – as more political in
nature than as full-fledged socioeconomic rights. This is related to
the classic liberal view that property promotes individual liberty and
autonomy. Socioeconomic rights agree in part, but focus instead on
the propertyless.
Socioeconomic rights constitute the cornerstone of the
substantive nature of post-liberal teleological constitutions. When a
constitution takes a position as to the importance, scope and effect of
rights associated with education, health, labor and other similar
matters, the constitution transcends its neutrality, takes a substantive
position and molds the future development of society. Even
teleological constitutions whose only substantive features are its
socioeconomic rights – that is, they are not accompanied by other
policy provisions – those rights make all the difference as to the
substantive nature of the constitution.
There are many objections to the inclusion of socioeconomic
rights in constitutions. Most are premised on their positive and
vertical versions.21 In these circumstances, the main concern is
that the constitution promises that which the government cannot
deliver. When that happens, the constitution is weakened
because there is a generalized sensation that one or several of its
19. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1239.
20. Gardbaum, supra note 4, at 396.
21. See Jon Elster, Clearing and Strengthening the Channels of Constitution Making in
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 28 (Tom Ginsburg ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
2012) (noting the issue of the economic viability of these types of provisions); Venter,
GLOBAL FEATURES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 102, Op. Cit. note 14.
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provisions become dead letter, which casts doubts on the
authoritativeness and effectiveness of the entire constitution
itself. It is better, they argue, not to have them in the first place.
This has also added to the view that, simply put, socioeconomic
rights are not really constitutional rights: “Though many countries
have included welfare rights or obligations in their constitutions, no
democratic country has placed social and economic rights on
precisely the same legal footing as the familiar civil and political
liberties.”22 While I may disagree with the current universality of
this affirmation, since I believe that some democratic countries have
given some socioeconomic rights the same legal footing their civil
and political counterparts, Glandon’s point is highly relevant as to
the generalized problem of under-enforcement that results in undervaluation of socioeconomic rights.
The specific problem of judicial under-enforcement is
reinforced by scholarly skepticism: “Until recently, most U.S.
scholars placed socioeconomic rights outside the constitutional
domain and beyond the enforcement power of courts.”23 This in
turns facilitates courts from reading those provisions out of their
constitutions.24 What is puzzling to me is that many modern
democracies, even those that embrace the framework model, do in
fact recognize and enforce socioeconomic rights, it is just that
they are of a statutory nature.25 For example, labor laws in the
United States that establish minimum wages, maximum hours and
collective bargaining rights are all socioeconomic in nature, yet
are easily enforced. That is why some scholars have called for an
adequate enforcement of these rights when they are given
constitutional rank.26 In other words, it makes little difference as
to the practical application of a right if it has statutory or
constitutional rank.
If statutory socioeconomic rights are
normally enforced, so should those same rights that are promoted
to constitutional status. As such, it would seem that the objections
22. Glandon, supra note 12, at 527. Pascal makes a similar argument: “Yet no
Constitution places these rights on the same constitutional footing as civil or political
rights.” (Emphasis added.) Pascal, supra note 6, at 884.
23. Hershkoff & Loffredo, supra note 15, at 925.
24. Pascal, supra note 6, at 863.
25. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1243.
26. See Jeffrey Omar Usman, Good Enough for Government Work: The Interpretation
of Positive Constitutional Rights in State Constitutions, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1459, 1517 (2010);
Schwartz, supra note 7; Glandon, supra note 12; Pascal, supra note 6.
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are more ideological than conceptual as to these types of rights.
There are also objections to the judiciary’s institutional capacity
and legitimacy to put these rights into effect.27 Our task here is
simpler: to clarify the content, scope and reach of these rights so that,
when the time comes, the goal of identifying an enforcement model
is not thwarted by conceptual confusion.
We must shed many of the prejudices and assumptions normally
associated with socioeconomic rights. It is an undeniable fact that
they have become a generalized feature of many modern
constitutions. Bognador explains that today’s constitutions are
“more than a mere organization chart.”28 Not only do they include a
bill of rights that protects civil liberties, they “may also include a
charter of social and economic rights, something characteristic of
constitutions of the twentieth century.”29 Scholars like King make
similar observations: “In more recent times, bills of rights have been
quite expansive, embracing socioeconomic rights.”30 This requires a
careful look at the different constitutions that are in existence right
now, in order to explore what we might have missed. The
description of the South African Constitution’s recognition of
socioeconomic rights as giving it an “unique character” is puzzling to
me, due to the many other constitutions that do include these rights
and put them in effect.31 Like their civil and political counterparts,
socioeconomic rights have been on the rise for the past sixty years.
They are less and less unique and more and more part of the
constitutional mainstream.
If the problem of socioeconomic rights is enforcement, then
it is the duty of constitutional jurists to step up to the plate and
propose solutions. Yet, as we are about to see, negative and
horizontal socioeconomic rights are quite easy to enforce. This
should represent a decisive blow to the enforcement-based
objections to socioeconomic rights that were thought to be
27. Heinz Klug, South Africa’s Constitutional Court in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS
307, Op. Cit. note 5; Hershkoff & Loffredo, supra note 15, at 934; Pascal, supra note 6, at
863; Venter, GLOBAL FEATURES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 84, Op. Cit. note 14.
28. Vernon Bogdanor, Introduction in CONSTITUTIONS IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 4
(Vernon Bognador ed., Gower, United Kingdom, 1988).
29. Id.
30. King 83, Op. Cit. note 17. See also Glandon, supra note 12, at 523˗24; Schwartz,
supra note 7, at 1233.
31. Klug 267, Op. Cit. note 27. See also Venter, CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON 145,
Op. Cit. note 8 (describing South Africa’s Bill of Rights as “avant garde” as to this issue).
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inherently positive and vertical. If many political rights are
easily enforced because of their negative character – which we
are about to see is not always the case, since, like with their
socioeconomic counterparts, political and civil rights can also
come in the positive and horizontal variety – then negative
socioeconomic rights can just as easily be put into practice. So,
as to them, most objections again would seem to be political
instead of based on constitutional theory. If that is the case, we
should not shield an ideological objection behind legal argument.
Rights as to Their Effects
Here we focus on the uses of the right, that is, whether they
forbid or compel action. As to this feature, we focus on the
distinction between negative and positive rights.
Negative Rights
These are the easiest to enforce, probably because it simply
requires striking down the action that violated them. Simply put,
negative rights protect us against something else. It basically acts as
a shield.32
Negative rights are not inherently political or
socioeconomic, nor vertical or horizontal.33 A shield can protect a
whole host of rights and against a wide range of actors. It can
protect our political and civil rights as well as our socioeconomic
rights, and it can also protect us against the state or against private
forces or entities.
The ease of enforcement as to negative rights lies in the lack of
affirmative or creative remedial action needed for their vindication.
If a local government entity censors a small newspaper and there is a
constitutional right to free speech, a court need only invalidate the
state action; if a group of workers goes on strike having a
constitutional right to do so and an employer attempts to fire them, a
court need only stop the employer from going forward with the
disciplinary action; and so on.
These examples illustrate the erroneous characterization of
32. See Harding, supra note 9, at 433 (referencing Canada’s Charter of Rights as
limiting the power of the legislature to interfere with individual rights).
33. See Gardbaum, supra note 4, at 444.
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socioeconomic rights as purely or even mainly positive rights in
relation to their effect, and vice versa. For example, the right of
workers to strike is a negative socioeconomic right. Furthermore, it
is enforceable against a private party, making it a horizontal as well
as a negative socioeconomic right. Negative rights have no
substantive content, yet they give substantive provisions like
socioeconomic rights greater scope and reach by transcending their
generalized characterization as only entitlements that require
affirmative government action and financial disbursement. Negative
socioeconomic rights do not require a direct disbursement of public
funds, thus destroying one of the main argument against
socioeconomic rights in general. In fact, they can even cost less than
positive political and civil rights. As such, it seems that most of the
cost-based objections to socioeconomic rights, as well as other
competency concerns, are more adequately opposed to the notion of
positive rights, whether they are political and civil or socioeconomic
in nature. As a result, negative socioeconomic rights should be
exempt from these types of objections.
The examples we just mentioned are a good sample of negative
rights: freedom of speech; right to strike.
Positive Rights
There are several examples of a positive right, some even found
in U.S. constitutional doctrine, such as the right to access public
information, jury trial and the right to counsel in criminal
proceedings. Other positive rights include a safe workplace and
access to a free public education.
Positive rights compel action. Like negative rights, these have
no inherent substantive content. The compelled entity need not
necessarily be public or related to the government. Private parties
can also be compelled to action.34 As to their specific articulation,
Usman identifies five specific types: (1) authorizations to act, (2)
non-justiciable positive rights, (3) non-self-executing rights, (4)
highly specific enforceable provisions, and (5) abstract enforceable
provisions.35 As to enforcement, all of these forms of positive rights
34. Id., at 441, noting that some rights “may, at least in principle, also impose positive
duties on [private actors].”
35. Usman, supra note 26, at 1514.
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have a role to play, from statutory construction to serving as
authorization for legislative action.
It should be noted that “not all positive rights are social or
economic in nature . . . [they can also] involve protective duties
respecting civil and political rights.”36 Also, “the converse is true:
not all social and economic rights are positive rights.”37 This is key,
because many times there seems to be an automatic correlation
between positive and vertical rights, that is, obligations on the part of
the state. For example, Pascal states that “positive rights always
require some type of affirmative governmental action.”38 If a private
employer is required to offer its employees safe working conditions
as a positive right of the latter, outside from the judicial enforcement
element that would be present if the workers wish to vindicate that
right in court, no additional affirmative government action is needed.
This conceptual confusion has been problematic, because it has
added to the notion that socioeconomic rights are inherently
unenforceable: “Economic rights, so-called second generation rights
such as healthcare, housing, education, etc. are the equivalent of
positive rights, while negative rights include classic political
freedoms, so-called first generation rights such as freedom of speech
and religion.”39 While the list of rights used by Usman as an
example of economic rights are, indeed, positive in their effect, we
have seen that there are negative socioeconomic rights as well as
positive political and civil rights. That dichotomy should be put to
rest.
The main problem with positive rights, whether they are
political, socioeconomic, horizontal or vertical, is the issue of
judicial enforcement.40 Positive rights are probably the greatest
challenge for courts. As we saw, this challenge is separate from the
general enforceability of socioeconomic rights. Even positive
political rights are tricky to implement. So, the issue is not the
enforceability of socioeconomic rights in particular, but of positive
rights in general. When it comes to positive rights, a challenged act can
36. Gardbaum, supra note 4, at 445.
37. Id.
38. (Emphasis added) Pascal, supra note 6, at 865. See also Usman, supra note 26, at
1461.
39. Usman, supra note 26, at 1464.
40. Id., at 1491˗95; Allan R. Brewer-Carías, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS POSITIVE
LEGISLATORS: A COMPARATIVE LAW STUDY (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2011).
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be declared unconstitutional “not for what it provides but for what it
fails to provide.”41
The issue of the judicial enforceability of positive right has raised
separation of powers concerns.42 Negative rights, whether political or
socioeconomic, vertical or horizontal, fall easier within the traditional
judicial function as negative legislators.43 While some negative rights
have substantial policy implications, like a ban on privatizations of
state-owned enterprises, positive rights have substantial governance
implications. When a court acts as a negative legislator, it merely has to
strike down the challenged act.44 But when it comes to positive rights,
the issue of alternatives as to remedies becomes trickier.45 The main
point is that positive rights create an affirmative duty on whomever they
bind. But these difficulties should not be used as an excuse to undo
what the people have decided: “The decision to include socioeconomic
provisions in a state constitution [read: positive] thus is understood as a
mandate to the legislature that narrows the scope of political
discretion.”46 Courts should not be able to erase this constitutional
mandate. As Pascal explains, “[i]f social rights are truly unenforceable
[again, read: positive], they may be meaningless provisions in
constitutions, or even undermine constitutional legitimacy.”47
Finally, some scholars believe that “the difference between
negative and positive rights has been overemphasized.”48 They point
to the fact that some negative rights have “complementary positive
41. Tania Groppi, Italy: The Italian Constitutional Court: Towards a ‘Multilevel
System’ of Constitutional Review in CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS 135, Op. Cit. note 1.
42. Pascal, supra note 6, at 864; Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1238.
43. Brewer-Carías 5, Op. Cit. note 40; Anna Gamper & Francisco Palermo, The
Constitutional Court of Austria: Modern Profiles on an Archetype of Constitutional Review
in CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS 34, Op. Cit. note 1.
44. Rosenfeld, supra note 15, at 5.
45. For example, some courts have adopted an approach based on giving the legislature
wide deference as to the implementation of positive rights, especially as to the means to be
used, limiting themselves to a reasonableness analysis of those actions. See Gardbaum,
supra note 4, at 452. See also Usman, supra note 26, at 1495 (discussing that the “tendency
of foreign judiciaries whose national constitutions contain affirmative rights provisions has
been to avoid aggressive enforcement of such rights out of concern about distorting budgets,
interfering with policy-making, and exceeding separation of powers limitations”).
46. (Emphasis added.) Hershkoff & Loffredo, supra note 15, at 929.
47. Pascal, supra note 6, at 864. Note the seemingly interchangeability of “positive”
and “socioeconomic” rights. I think both Pascal’s and Hershkoff & Loffredo’s preference
for the socioeconomic label is a testament of the current mainstream dichotomy that
negative-equals-political-rights while positive-equals-socioeconomic-rights.
48. Pascal, supra note 6, at 866.
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duties.”49 If this is true, then there is hope that all constitutional
rights, independent of their nature and effect, are capable of being
judicially enforced, even if using different standards of review. As
Pascal proposes, “constitutional rights create expectations that they
will be judicially enforced if necessary.”50 When discussing
socioeconomic rights, I objected to the notion that, for example,
South Africa was singled out as one of the few systems that actually
enforces socioeconomic rights. Once we recognize the existence of
negative or horizontal socioeconomic rights, we can find many
examples of countries around the world that do have and enforce
these types of substantive rights. However, when we address the
issue of positive rights of a socioeconomic nature, then South Africa
does represent an island in an ocean.51 But that island is by no
means alone; we just have to look harder.
Rights as to Their Reach
Here we focus on the interaction of these rights, that is, against
whom are they opposable. As to this feature, we focus on the
distinction between vertical and horizontal rights.
Vertical Rights
Examples of these are: freedom of speech and the right to a free
public education.
Simply put, these are rights that an individual has against the
government.
In their negative form, verticality enjoins the
government from encroaching a particular right. In its positive form,
it creates an entitlement the government must address affirmatively.
In the beginning, most constitutional rights were vertical in their
reach. This has structural and ideological explanations. First,
because the earlier constitutions were about government and not
society, the rights contained in them only protected people from the
state. This is the social contract theory at work, where the
constitution is a contract between the individual and the state.
49. Id.
50. Id., at 868.
51. “In many ways, positive rights litigation in South Africa has been an anomaly.”
Pascal, supra note 6, at 889.
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Therefore, the rights mentioned in the constitution only apply to the
parties in the contract. Second, there is an ideological motivation
here which identifies the government as the main threat to individual
liberty. In order to protect that liberty, rights against the government
must exist, especially those that have negative effect. This is at the
core of the liberal democratic tradition, which is why many
structuralist constitutional systems require state action in order to
enforce a constitutional right.52
Positive rights changed this ideological view. While still
opposable to the state in their vertical articulation, by creating
entitlements from the state, the government becomes a source of
benefit and support instead of oppression. This is also an ideological
stance, which is why constitutions that include positive rights against
the state, especially of a socioeconomic nature, signal at minimum, a
social-democratic or post-liberal approach to public power. “A right
against” signals that the other entity in the equation may abuse its
power. “A right to” signals that the transaction to be had is
beneficial. Like political and negative rights, vertical rights were the
first born as to the issue of reach. The state was the focus of these
rights, particularly of a negative sort.
Horizontal Rights
Examples of horizontal rights are privacy, minimum wage
provisions, guarantees of safe working conditions, and so on.
Not all sources of oppression and threats to individual liberty
come from the government. Powerful private interests also affect the
daily lives of citizens. Horizontal rights apply laterally, that is, from
citizen to citizen. They are meant to shield against or create an
entitlement opposable to private parties.53
Although most of the rights found in classic structural
constitutions are vertical, not all are. For example, the abolition of
slavery in the United States by way of the Thirteenth Amendment
interfered with the relationship between masters and slaves. Other
framework-based systems have found that, while their rights are first
and foremost vertical in their reach, there are spillover horizontal
52. Gardbaum, supra note 4, at 397.
53. Hershkoff & Loffredo, supra note 15, at 929 (The authors mention workplace
conditions as a form of horizontal right.).
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effects. An example of this that courts will interpret private law
through the prism of the corresponding vertical constitutional right.54
For their part, teleological constitutions tend to include a host of
rights that have express horizontal reach.55
The right of privacy, for example, can be articulated to protect
us not only against unwanted and unjustified government intrusion,
but against nosy neighbors and abusive employers. The protection of
privacy rights, which are based on the existence on a minimum space
of autonomy, can be just as important against the state as against
private entities and even other individuals.
Rights as to Their Titleholder
Here we focus on the bearer of the right, that is, who actually
possesses it. As to this feature, we focus on the distinction between
individual and collective rights.
Individual Rights
Since the days of the early framework constitutions, the
individual has been the main protagonist of the rights revolution.
This reflects both a physical and ideological stance.
First,
individuals are the basic unit of human existence. Each person
represents an independent component of the political community.
Second, the individual as a political concept is the centerpiece of
liberalism.
Most rights belong to an individual. Even if we are in a group,
as it relates to rights, that group is merely a collection of individuals.
When a particular association engages in protest, it is the members
who have the right to protest, not the organization as a separate
entity. They have just decided to exercise their individual rights
collaboratively.

54. Gardbaum, supra note 4, at 433; Venter, CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON 126, Op.
Cit. note 8 (characterizing the approach in Germany as the “radiation effect” and in Japan
the “spillover effect”).
55. See Klug, Constitutional Authority 280, Op. Cit. note 27.
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Collective Rights
But not all rights can be exercised by an individual. Some rights
require the existence of two or more persons. These are collective
rights because they cannot be exercised by a single individual. For
example, in the labor arena, many constitutions recognize the right to
engage in collective bargaining. By definition, a single worker
cannot engage in such type of bargaining. For that matter, the right
to engage in a strike or concerted activity requires the presence of an
additional person. Collective rights are not the sum of your right and
mine. On the contrary, they are our rights, even if only one of us
vindicates it in the judicial arena. Some constitutions give rights
expressly to groups.56
It All Comes Together: The Multiple Manifestation of Rights
A right can be classified by its nature, effect, reach and
titleholder. Its nature can be civil and political or social and
economic. Its effect can be negative or positive. Its reach can be
vertical or horizontal. Its holder can be individual or collective. Each
classification can engage with the other, thus creating a very wide
range of possible rights articulations. A few examples will suffice to
illustrate these combinations.57
-Negative, Political and Vertical: Freedom of speech
-Positive, Political and Vertical: Access to public information
-Negative, Socioeconomic and Vertical: Right to strike of
public employees
-Positive, Socioeconomic and Vertical: Universal free public
elementary education
-Negative, Political and Horizontal: Ban on slavery
-Positive, Political and Horizontal: Religious freedom in the
workplace
-Negative, Socioeconomic and Horizontal: Ban on unjust
dismissal in the workplace
56. Kommers 170, Op. Cit. note 1; Venter, CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON 131, Op. Cit.
note 8.
57. For reasons of expediency, I did not use the individual-collective variable for these
examples.
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-Positive, Socioeconomic and Horizontal: Safe working
conditions
Let us briefly examine these different articulations.
The right of freedom of speech is an example of a political right
that can be articulated to protect us against state action. In that
sense, it is political in nature because it is related to personal
freedom and expression that is essential to democratic governance; it
is negative in its effect because it shields the bearer against action
generated by an external entity; it is vertical because, at least in this
example, it is opposable to state action.
The right to access public information is political because, like
freedom of speech, it is essential to democratic governance. It is also
normally opposable to the state, thus vertical in its reach. But, unlike
freedom of speech, this right compels government action, thus
earning the label of positive.
A constitutional right of public employees to go on strike is
socioeconomic in nature, as it pertains to labor relations. Because it
deals with public employees, it is essentially vertical in its reach.
Finally, because the right to strike shields employees from adverse
action, it is mostly a negative right.
The right to a free public education is mostly socioeconomic in
nature, as it deals with an essential material human need. It is
vertical because, like in the case of public employees, public
education is a matter of state concern. Finally, like with the right to
access public information, the right to a public education compels
government action to provide one. This, it can be characterized as a
positive right.
A ban on slavery guarantees a free citizenry. This is a
quintessential political right. Since most slaves are owned by private
persons, and not the state, its prohibition has horizontal effect and,
because it prohibits action, it is principally a negative right.
A constitutional right that recognizes freedom of worship in the
private workplace is political in nature, because it goes to the heart
of personal liberty. It is horizontal because it is applicable to private
employers. Finally, it is negative because it shields the bearer from
intervention against the exercise of the right.
The right against unjust dismissal in the workplace is, like the
one before, clearly negative in that it prohibits action, and is
horizontal in reach because it enjoins private employers. Yet, it is
socioeconomic in nature because it protects the status of employment
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and a person’s livelihood.
Finally, we have the right to safe working conditions which,
like in the case of unjust dismissals, is horizontal because it
applies to private employers and is socioeconomic because it
goes to the intricacies of the worker-employer relation. Yet, it is
positive in its effect because it requires action on the part of the
employer to take the necessary steps to guarantee a safe working
environment.
Conclusion
Rights have multiple features and layers; they come in all shapes
and sizes. In turn, these features can constantly interlock with each
other, creating a wide range of possible articulations which are
different from one another. We have offered a few of those features,
relating to the nature, reach, effect and title. There may be more
features and even more articulations within the feature I have
proposed. The point remains: When it comes to constitutional
rights, a broader look is called for.
At the very least, I hope this allows a fresh look at
socioeconomic rights and other policy provisions that are included in
modern, teleological constitutions, particularly of a post-liberal
nature. By dissecting with greater care, we can be in a position to
offer models of interpretation and application that allow greater
judicial enforcement of these rights that have earned constitutional
status. It is up to us to find a way to make them become a reality.

